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O P I N I O N* 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, 
Keisha Sutherland was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2007.  She twice 
applied for social security benefits—once in 2007 and once in 2010.  The petitions were 
eventually consolidated, and the Social Security Administration denied her application.  
After a review of the record, focusing specifically on the closed period beginning in 2007 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




through November 2008, we conclude that the Administration’s decision is supported by 
substantial evidence.  We will thus affirm.  
I.  
In July 2007, Sutherland was hospitalized after the police found her wandering 
outside her home, incoherent and partially clothed.1  After she was discharged, 
Sutherland began psychiatric treatment with Dr. Habibah E. Mosley.  Dr. Mosley 
diagnosed Sutherland with bipolar disorder and assessed her a Global Assessment of 
Functioning (“GAF”) score of 50, which suggests “serious impairment in social, 
occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).”  J.A. 30 
(quoting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 34 (4th 
Ed. 2000)).  Dr. Mosley prescribed medication to treat Sutherland’s symptoms.  
Sutherland subsequently applied for social security disability benefits and supplemental 
security income. 
As a result of the application, Dr. Frederick Kurz conducted a consultative 
examination of Sutherland in October 2007.  Dr. Kurz concluded that Sutherland had no 
express indications of depression or anxiety and assessed her a GAF score of 65, 
suggesting only mild impairment.  He noted that if Sutherland “consistently took her 
medication,” her symptoms could be “stabilized and controlled.”  J.A. 32.  Dr. Douglas 
Fugate, a state agency psychologist, also reviewed Sutherland’s records, but did not 
                                              
1 The facts presented and the characterizations of the physicians’ reports and opinions are 





personally examine Sutherland.  Dr. Fugate concluded that Sutherland had “mild 
restriction of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, 
persistence, or pace, and one or two episodes of decompensation for an extended 
duration.”  Id.  He also identified a “history of hospitalizations and noncompliance in 
taking her medication,” but ultimately reached the same conclusion as Dr. Kurz and 
assessed her a GAF score of 65.  Id. 
Sutherland continued to see Dr. Mosley through 2008.  At several points, Dr. 
Mosley adjusted Sutherland’s medication dosages to properly treat her bipolar disorder.  
But later that year, Sutherland suffered a relapse and reported that she stopped taking her 
medication.  She was again hospitalized.  Following that period of hospitalization, Dr. 
Mosley reported that Sutherland was “doing better” and adjusted her medication.  J.A. 
31.  Dr. Mosley then completed a mental impairment questionnaire for the purposes of 
Sutherland’s application.  She concluded that Sutherland responded well to treatment, 
that she was limited but satisfactory in her ability to remember work-like procedures and 
maintain regular attendance, and that she was seriously limited in but not precluded from 
understanding simple instructions, maintaining work routines, and performing at a 
consistence pace.  She further concluded that Sutherland was “moderately limited in 
performing the activities of daily living; would have moderate difficulties in maintaining 
social functioning and in maintaining concentration persistence, or pace; and had three, 
two-week episodes of decompensation within a twelve-month period.”  J.A. 31–32.  She 
also concluded that Sutherland is “markedly limited and unable to meet competitive 




supervisors, getting along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or 
exhibiting behavioral extremes, and dealing with normal work stress.”  J.A. 31.  Dr. 
Mosley assessed her a GAF score of 40. 
After review of Sutherland’s application and her medical records, the ALJ 
concluded that, despite her diagnosis of bipolar disorder, Sutherland had the residual 
functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform simple, unskilled light work . . . [that] required 
no more than occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the general 
public.”  J.A. 35.  The Appeals Council affirmed.  On review, the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware granted Sutherland’s motion for summary judgment 
and remanded for further proceedings.  It determined that “the ALJ pointed to no medical 
evidence that would contradict Dr. Mosley’s December 2008 conclusion that 
[Sutherland’s] GAF was 40 . . . . If the conclusion was based on the ALJ’s own medical 
judgment (as it appears to have been), that would be improper.”  J.A. 40.  Because the 
ALJ “articulated no viable basis to discount Dr. Mosley’s opinion,” the District Court 
remanded to the Administration to provide further explanation.  J.A. 40.  
On remand, the Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to: (1) address Dr. Mosley’s 
GAF scores of 40 and 50 and the reasons for discrediting those opinions; (2) evaluate the 
weight given to Dr. Mosley’s opinion, and whether contradictory medical evidence 
exists; and (3) further evaluate the GAF scores.  The Appeals Council also instructed that, 
if warranted, the ALJ should update the medical evidence on the record, further consider 
Sutherland’s RFC, and obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert.  At the 




beginning in 2009.  That was consolidated with the original petition and remanded to the 
ALJ to review Sutherland’s claim from 2007 through 2014.  The closed period of the 
initial application from 2007 through the hospitalization in November 2008, however, 
was of particular importance on remand.  
After a hearing and testimony from Sutherland, the ALJ denied the consolidated 
application.  It first evaluated Dr. Mosley’s opinion of disability and declined to give it 
controlling weight.  First, there were virtually no treatment records from Dr. Mosley.  
Thus, Dr. Mosley’s opinion lacked corroborating outpatient records to confirm the 
treatment relationship between Dr. Mosley and Sutherland.  Specifically, the ALJ only 
had from Dr. Mosley an August 2007 psychological evaluation, prescriptions from 2007 
and 2008, the November 20, 2008 treatment notes, and the December 2008 medical 
questionnaire.  The notes from August 2007 document a perfect score on a mini-mental 
status examination.  The notes from the November 2008 examination, which immediately 
preceded the issuance of Dr. Mosley’s disability opinion, recorded that she was doing 
better after the hospitalization and had a clear and organized thought process, an 
appropriate affect, and no delusions or hallucinations.  While Sutherland’s attention and 
concentration were impaired, her mental status during the periods of hospitalization 
improved when she resumed medication.  This was also weighed against the 2007 Dr. 
Kurz report, which found no mental status deficiencies and only mild limitations in 
understanding simple instructions.  
As to Dr. Mosley’s assessment of a GAF score of 40, the ALJ concluded that it 




discharged from inpatient treatment.  And although during this period she received GAF 
scores of 15 and 14, those scores were likely reasonable as they were assessed during her 
November 2008 hospitalization.  The ALJ further noted that the GAF score of 14 may be 
a clerical error, because the hospital would not have given Sutherland a lower score than 
her initial score when it also discharged her as stable. 
Because the appeal was consolidated, the ALJ considered additional medical 
evidence from 2010 to 2014.  Dr. De Yanez treated Sutherland and assessed her a GAF 
score of 65 in 2011, and 60 in 2012.  On a medical questionnaire form, Dr. De Yanez 
concluded that Sutherland’s bipolar disorder could be managed with medication.  Dr. De 
Yanez’s outlook for Sutherland was more positive than others, concluding that 
Sutherland had the ability to respond to detailed instructions and perform complex tasks.  
The ALJ credited Dr. De Yanez’s assessment in part but concluded that Sutherland is 
more limited than Dr. De Yanez found. 
Sutherland’s most recent treating physicians, Dr. Dupree and therapist Roberts, 
treated Sutherland beginning in 2012.  In a 2014 medical questionnaire, they concluded 
that Sutherland is unable to work on a full-time basis, keep a schedule, follow verbal and 
written instructions, and participate in work even with accommodations or modifications.  
They further noted that Sutherland is unable to work due to the severity of her episodes.  
The ALJ, after detailing the treatment notes in the record from Dr. Dupree and Roberts, 
rejected their conclusion because the record did not support the finding that Sutherland 
could not work in any capacity or that she had suffered from severe episodes since her 




because Sutherland has the ability to perform unskilled work activity with additional 
limitations.  
The Appeals Council affirmed, and Sutherland again petitioned for review in the 
District Court.  It granted summary judgment in favor of the Administration.  Sutherland 
subsequently appealed.  
II.2 
The Administration reviews applications for disability benefits by conducting a 
five-step sequential analysis.  First, it determines whether the claimant is engaged in 
substantial gainful activity.  See Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1986).  
If the claimant is not, it then determines whether the claimant is suffering from a severe 
impairment or a combination of impairments that is severe.  Id.  It then reviews a list of 
impairments that automatically preclude any gainful work.  Id. at 583–84.  If the 
claimant’s impairment is not on the list, it then determines whether the claimant retains 
the RFC to perform past relevant work, i.e., “that which [the] individual is still able to do 
despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).”  Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 
F.3d 34, 40 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 
121 (3d Cir. 2000)).  And if he or she cannot return to past work, it then determines 
whether the impairment precludes adjustment to any available work.  See Brewster, 786 
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F.2d at 584.  If the claimant is unable to adjust to any available work, they are entitled to 
benefits. 
We review the Administration’s final decision under the same standard the District 
Court applied: substantial evidence.  We ask if the decision is supported by “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”  Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pierce v. 
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)).  Substantial evidence requires “more than a 
[mere] scintilla” but may be less than a preponderance of the evidence.  Tri-state Truck 
Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 616 F.2d 65, 69 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  We do not “weigh the evidence or substitute [our] 
conclusions for those of the fact-finder.”  Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  “A single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the 
[Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.  
Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence—particularly certain 
types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)—or if it really constitutes not 
evidence but mere conclusion.”  Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983). 
III. 
A. The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.  
Sutherland urges that the Administration’s decision is not supported by substantial 
evidence and that we should award her benefits.  She specifically points to the closed 
period of the original application, i.e., the 2007–2008 period of disability between the 




improperly discredited Dr. Mosley’s opinion in this time period.  She argues that the ALJ 
relied on later-in-time evidence to conclude that Sutherland had the RFC to work.  
Specifically, she argues the ALJ relied on the mental impairment questionnaire of Dr. De 
Yanez to discredit Dr. Mosley’s 2008 questionnaire.  The only medical evidence that 
could contradict Dr. Mosley’s opinion, she argues, is the consultative examination by Dr. 
Kurz and the record review by Dr. Fugate.  Sutherland believes these submissions cannot 
trump Dr. Mosley’s findings.  See Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (“A 
cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility determinations is that the ALJ accord 
treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially when their opinions reflect expert 
judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a prolonged 
period of time.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Sutherland principally relies on our decision in Morales.  There, the claimant had 
Dependent Personality Disorder and a history of drug and alcohol abuse.  Id. at 312–13.  
A treating physician concluded that Morales had an “impaired ability to concentrate, 
perform activities within a schedule, make decisions, be aware of normal hazards, and 
function when under stress or change.”  Id. at 313.  His long-time treating physician, Dr. 
Erro, further concluded that “his ability to deal with work stresses, behave in an 
emotionally stable manner, relate predictably in social situations, and demonstrate 
reliability is . . . ‘poor or none.’”  Id. at 315.  The treatment records corroborated that 
conclusion.  Id.  Another physician noted that Morales appeared to be intentionally 
obstructive and purposefully answered questions incorrectly.  Id. at 314.  A non-




conclusion: Morales is not significantly limited and can “remember locations and work-
like procedures, understand and remember simple instructions, ask simple questions or 
request assistance, maintain socially appropriate behavior, take normal precautions, and 
use public transportation.”  Id. at 314.  Despite the weight of evidence in one direction, 
the ALJ relied on the non-examining physician’s report and discredited the treating 
physician’s report “based on his personal observations of Morales at the administrative 
hearing, the evidence in the record of malingering, and notations in Dr. Erro’s treatment 
notes that Morales was stable and well controlled with medication.”  Id. at 317.  We 
concluded that the ALJ’s decision lacked substantial evidence because it relied on the 
non-treating examiner’s conclusion and its own opinion, without properly discrediting the 
weight of evidence suggesting the claimant was disabled.  See id. at 319 (“Shorn of its 
rhetoric, this determination rests solely on a rejection of medically-credited 
symptomatology and opinion, the ALJ’s personal observations and speculation, and the 
testimony of a non-examining vocational expert[.]”). 
The evidence on the record here does not warrant the same conclusion.  Unlike in 
Morales, Dr. Kurz’s consultative examination included a personal examination of 
Sutherland.  Contra id. at 319 (emphasizing the ALJ’s reliance on a non-examining 
physician’s report).  As part of the examination, Dr. Kurz completed an identical medical 
impairment questionnaire as Dr. Mosley and concluded that Sutherland had only mild 
limitations in understanding simple instructions and performing tasks.  While it is true 
that “[a] cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility determinations is that the ALJ 




‘cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason.’”  Id. at 317 (quoting Plummer 
v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)).  In addition to placing due weight on Dr. 
Kurz’s examination, the ALJ gave multiple sound reasons to discredit Dr. Mosley’s 
opinion: (1) There are no outpatient records from Dr. Mosley to confirm her treatment 
relationship; (2) Dr. Mosley did not record any deficiencies after Sutherland’s 
hospitalization in November 2008 before completing the medical questionnaire; (3) She 
performed well on the mini-mental status examination in August 2007; and (4) 
Sutherland saw improvement after hospitalization when medication resumed.  Unlike 
Morales, the ALJ here did not speculate regarding the reasons for claimant’s alleged 
disability, but rather relied upon evidence in the record to conclude that Sutherland is not 
disabled.3  
 Sutherland also argues that the ALJ failed to consider enumerated factors when 
concluding that Dr. Mosley’s opinion should not receive controlling weight.  See 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (setting out factors).  Under the regulations, the ALJ should 
“consider all of the following factors in deciding the weight [to] give to any medical 
opinion”: (1) examining relationship; (2) treatment relationship including length of 
treatment and nature and extent of the treatment; (3) supportability of the evidence; (4) 
consistency with other evidence; (5) specialization of the professional; and (6) other 
                                              
3 Sutherland argues that the ALJ inappropriately relied on later-in-time evidence, namely 
Dr. De Yanez’s report in 2011 that assessed a GAF score of 65, to discredit Dr. Mosley’s 
opinion. Although the ALJ references Dr. De Yanez’s report when discussing Dr. 
Mosley’s opinion, even without her report, the ALJ offered substantial evidence to 




factors brought to the attention of the ALJ.  Id. at § 404.1527(c)(1)–(6).  Although the 
ALJ did not specifically identify each factor, all relevant factors were considered 
throughout the lengthy, detailed opinion.  See Massanari, 247 F.3d at 42 (“Although we 
do not expect the ALJ to make reference to every relevant treatment note in a case . . . we 
do expect the ALJ, as the factfinder, to consider and evaluate the medical evidence in the 
record consistent with his responsibilities under the regulations and case law.”).  Here, 
the ALJ conducted a thorough examination of the record and appropriately considered the 
relevant factors. 
 Sutherland also argues that the ALJ failed to appropriately consider the low GAF 
scores during the November 2008 hospitalization and relied on speculative inferences in 
dismissing them.  To the contrary, the ALJ thoroughly considered the scores.  It noted 
that the low GAF scores accurately reflect the time period during and immediately after 
hospitalization, but do not extend to later time periods.  It further dismissed GAF scores, 
in general, as an unreliable indicator of a claimant’s overall disability status and noted 
that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual has since ceased use of GAF scores.  And 
when addressing the particularly low GAF score of 14, it concluded that this may have 
been a clerical error.  Far from a speculative inference, that conclusion is supported by 
substantial evidence because it is unlikely the hospital would have discharged Sutherland 
if they also concluded she had a lower GAF score than when admitted.  It nonetheless 
credited the low GAF scores as reasonable for the limited time period when Mosley was 




to credit the low GAF scores for a limited time period and dismiss the scores as indicative 
of Sutherland’s overall RFC with substantial evidence.  
 Finally, Sutherland argues that the ALJ inappropriately relied on the fact that 
Sutherland is stable when compliant with her medication.  See Brownawell v. Comm’r of 
Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[A] doctor’s observation that a patient is 
‘stable and well controlled with medication during treatment does not [necessarily] 
support the medical conclusion that [the patient] can return to work.’” (quoting Morales, 
225 F.3d at 319)).  But in Brownawell, the ALJ’s reliance on the physician’s treatment 
note that Brownawell’s symptoms were stable with medication went against that 
physician’s ultimate conclusion that Brownawell is disabled.  See id. at 355 (“It is clear 
that Brownawell’s treating physician considered her to be disabled.”).  Here, both Dr. 
Kurz and Dr. De Yanez’s observations that, when compliant, Sutherland’s bipolar 
disorder can be controlled, coincide with conclusions that Sutherland has the capacity to 
work.  Thus the ALJ’s conclusion that Sutherland can return to work, even though it may 
require medical compliance, is supported by substantial evidence.    
 As for the 2009 to 2014 period of alleged disability, the ALJ’s conclusion that 
Sutherland was not disabled is also supported by substantial evidence.  Dr. De Yanez 
treated Sutherland from 2010 to 2012.  In 2011, Dr. De Yanez assessed Sutherland a 
GAF score of 65, and consistently reported in her treatment notes that Sutherland was 
doing well.  In 2012, Dr. De Yanez completed a medical impairment questionnaire and 
concluded that Sutherland was unlimited or very good in her ability to remember work-




that Sutherland was limited but satisfactory in her ability to remember and carry out 
detailed instructions.  She concluded that her impairments would not cause her to be 
absent from work.  Although Dr. De Yanez provided the most positive outlook for 
Sutherland, the ALJ moderated Dr. De Yanez’s conclusions, giving considerable weight 
to her conclusion that Sutherland can follow simple instructions, but rejecting the opinion 
that the claimant can perform more complex tasks.  That conclusion was based on the 
treatment records, as well as the opinions of the other treating physicians.  
As for Dr. Dupree and Roberts, the ALJ also rejected their conclusion that 
Sutherland could not return to work in any capacity, in part due to the severity of her 
episodes.  The ALJ reasonably concluded, after detailing Dr. Dupree and Roberts’ 
treatment notes, that, despite several periods of medical noncompliance, there is minimal 
evidence of severe episodes or relapses since Sutherland’s 2008 hospitalization.  The 
ALJ’s decision that those periods of medical non-compliance do not amount to work-
precluding episodes is supported by substantial evidence when considering the other 
opinions and evidence in the record.  
B. Remand is inappropriate, as the record contains sufficient medical 
documentation to determine Sutherland’s disability status. 
Sutherland argues that the ALJ failed to update the medical record on remand with 
sufficient evidence to make a disability determination.  See Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 
F.2d 31, 36 n.4 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Thus, in an SSI case, if there is insufficient medical 
documentation or if the medical documentation is unclear, it is incumbent upon the 




But here, the medical evidence is more than sufficient to make a disability determination, 
including documentation from several treating and non-treating physicians, as well as 
testimony from Sutherland at multiple hearings.4  Thus, the ALJ did not err in denying 
disability status based on the record before it.  
IV 
We will affirm the District Court’s order granting Summary Judgment because the 
ALJ’s conclusion that Sutherland is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence.  
 
                                              
4 Sutherland notes that the record only includes Dr. Mosley’s prescriptions from 2007 to 
2008, and not the corresponding treatment notes. While those may be helpful to a 
determination, the record was sufficient for the ALJ to make a determination of disability 




McKee, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 
I cannot agree that the ALJ’s decision to deny Ms. 
Sutherland disability benefits is supported by substantial 
evidence, and I therefore must respectfully dissent from my 
colleagues’ decision to affirm the ALJ’s ruling.  
The ALJ not only rejected the conclusions of Ms. 
Sutherland’s treating physicians, Dr. Mosley and Dr. Dupree, 
he also ignored the conclusion of Sutherland’s therapist, Ms. 
Roberts.  Those heath care professionals had the opportunity to 
observe Sutherland over a protracted period while she was 
compliant and taking her medication, as well as during those 
periods when she was either not taking her medication or when 
her symptoms were not adequately addressed by her 
medication.  All three of those healthcare professionals 
concluded that Sutherland’s bipolar disorder with psychotic 
features prevented her from working. Moreover, their 
assessment is consistent with, and confirmed by, the objective 
metric of her GAF scores.   
The ALJ’s decision to the contrary failed to give  
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the treating physicians’ medical conclusions the “great weight” 
required by our precedent, particularly in mental health cases.  
See Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Instead, the ALJ based his decision on his own review 
of the medical evidence and reliance on the statements of a 
non-treating physician who evaluated Ms. Sutherland at one 
moment in time. Most egregiously, however, the ALJ even 
interjected his own speculative conclusion that Sutherland’s 
GAF score of 14—indicating gross impairment—could be 
attributed to a clerical error. That conclusion is not based upon 
any testimony of any health care professional; it is based only 
upon the ALJ’s rank speculation.   
In Morales, we reaffirmed the principle that when an 
ALJ rejects a treating physician’s conclusion, the ALJ “may 
not make speculative inferences from medical reports” or 
substitute the ALJ’s “own credibility judgments, speculation, 
or lay opinion.”  Id. Yet, that is precisely what this ALJ did. 
The ALJ’s supposition that a possible clerical error accounts 
for evidence inconvenient to his conclusion is precisely the 
kind of speculative inference that Morales prohibits. 
My colleagues’ contrary conclusion relies upon the 
opinions of Dr. Kurz—a non-treating physician or 
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“consultative psychologist”—and Dr. Yanez. But that is 
inconsistent with our caution in Brownawell v. Comm’r Soc. 
Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Morales, 225 
F.3d at 319). There, we explained that stability on medication 
does not necessarily support a medical conclusion that the 
claimant can return to work. 
I therefore believe we should reverse the District 
Court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits, 
and instead direct that court to award benefits that she is clearly 
entitled to on this record. This administrative record has been 
fully developed and there is substantial evidence that 
Sutherland is disabled and entitled to benefits. See id. at 357-
58. “[T]he disability determination process has been delayed 
due to factors beyond the claimant’s control.”  Id. at 358. Ms. 
Sutherland has waited nearly 12 years for her claims to be 
adjudicated.  There is no good reason to make her wait any 
longer.  
 
 
 
 
  
